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 2 
Abstract 
Why did China choose certain policy over others that would achieve similar impact? Because 
China has a significant presence in the modern international community, it is difficult yet critical 
to understand the policy implications of the Chinese government under its unique political and 
socioeconomic context. This thesis shows the impact of a specific “price floor” policy China 
chose to employ in its oil and gasoline market, and identifies the factors concerning the Chinese 
regime that it took into consideration in the decision making process, through analysing data and 
official statements released by the government. After different parties affected by this policy are 
recognized, this thesis investigate how those impacts relate back to the Chinese government’s 
long-term agenda of energy security and environmental protection.  
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 5 
Introduction1 
On December 15th, 2015, an announcement released by the China2 National Development 
and Reform Commission3 stated the following: “Due to relevant provision of the current 
gasoline pricing mechanism, the adjustment of domestic gasoline4 price is hereby postponed.” 5 
But what was the exact “relevant provision” that China’s NDRC referred to? Nobody knew. And 
no clear answer was provided. Not until January 13th, 2016.  
 The fundamental components of China’s domestic gasoline pricing mechanism are 
included this equation:  
Gasoline “Government Referential” Price6 = Cost of refinement + Reasonable 
profit margin (up or down 4%) + Cost of Distribution + Adjustment based on 
International crude oil market price 
According to the official document, this general equation summarizes the gasoline pricing 
mechanism, and all of its components did not change after the January 13th revision except the 
                                         
1 For the purpose of clarity in this thesis, several definitions and explanations will be provided in the footnote to better frame the 
intended research question. 
2 “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China governed by the Chinese Communist Party, and this research is targeting the 
geographic region limited to mainland China, because regions such as Hong Kong and Macao follow different political systems 
under the “One nation, Two system” (一国两制) doctrine and the same analysis for mainland China might not be applicable. 
3 The National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展改革委员会) will be referred to in this thesis by its 
abbreviation, NDRC. This commission is in charge of determining economic and development policies at the national level, 
which includes setting commodity prices for all “refined oil product”.  
4 Chinese government’s pricing mechanism actually covers all “refined oil product (成品油)”, which is defined as gasoline, 
diesel and other fuel produced from crude oil. And “refined oil product (成品油)” was the term mentioned in all government 
documents. However, this thesis will target gasoline specifically in order to narrow the research question and achieve precision as 
well as clarity. Therefore, all of the research and analysis will directly address gasoline, instead of using the term, “refined oil 
product (成品油)”.  
5 See policy read, "我国暂缓调整国内成品油价格_中国政府网 (China pausing adjustment for gasoline price_Chinese Gov. 
website)", 2015 
6 Note that, this pricing mechanism is applied to gasoline’s retail price only. There is another system for wholesale, therefore, 
manufacturing and other industrial sectors’ consumption are not impacted by this “price floor” policy and will not be included in 
this thesis’s analysis.  
 6 
bolded adjustment section. In this equation, cost of refinement process and cost of distribution 
are assumed stable and isolated from international crude oil price. Before this new price floor 
policy was implemented, the NDRC was scheduled to announce adjustments for gasoline’s 
government referential price7 every two weeks. And the adjustment would be based on the 
percentage fluctuation of the international crude oil price. A decrease in international crude oil 
price would automatically lead to a proportional decrease in gasoline’s price. Unless the 
fluctuation was less than $1/barrel, then that adjustment would be accrued to the next period 
instead of being carried out immediately.  
On January 13th, 2016, this new “price floor” of $40/barrel, which essentially maintains a 
higher price and suspends the adjustment of gasoline pricing mechanism when the international 
crude oil price is plunging, was announced. It took the NDRC a month to finally follow-up on 
the “relevant provision” mentioned in the beginning. And these are ther exact statement NDRC 
provided for applying a price floor to the existing gasoline pricing mechanism on January 13th:  
It is necessary to establish new limits for domestic pricing mechanism … a “price 
floor” of $40/barrel will be set … when the international crude oil price drops 
below $40/barrel, the gasoline government referential price will no longer adjust 
accordingly…8 
This “price floor” , or at least that’s what the Chinese officials called it, was a surprise 
because most relevant parties of the gasoline pricing mechanism were expecting a large scale 
                                         
7 See Abaza and Jha, 2002. One example of application for such referential pricing system is towards banana producers in the 
European Union, since 1980s. And it is a single-industry case, whereas in China government referential price is the common 
practice.  
8 See policy read, "国家发展改革委就进一步完善成品油价格机制有关问题答记者问 (NDRC Q&As on Revising the 
Gasoline Pricing Mechanism through Price Floor Policy)". 
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down-regulation since the international crude oil price had plunged again from $43/barrel 
(November 2015) to $36/barrel (December 15th). The exact explanation provided alongside the 
decision to impose a “price floor” is the following: 
if price of oil is too low, in the short-term supply cost of gasoline can decrease. 
However, due to the nature of our country’s crude oil composition and high cost of 
production for this raw material, a plunging international crude oil price will 
increase China’s level of oil dependence to an even higher level (currently at above 
60%), and letting that happen could harm China’s energy security. Besides, low 
gasoline price caused by low international crude oil price is harmful to the 
conserving scarce resources and treating air pollution, as well as adjusting the 
structure of energy sector for development of sustainable clean energy. Therefore, a 
“price floor” is necessary for maintaining stability of domestic companies and 
achieving long-term energy and environment goals.9 
Since its implementation on January 13th, this new pricing mechanism has been effectively 
impacted by the “price floor” policy for 6 cycles. As shown in Figure 1, the international crude 
oil price recovered and reached a value greater than $40/barrel in April. Consequently, the 
adjustment resumed and the mechanism began to carry out as usual on April 26th. Therefore, the 
additional “price floor” is actually effective only for 4 months, even though the policy was 
implemented.  
                                         
9 See policy read, "油价调控设置“地板价”（政策解读） (Setting a Price Floor on Gasoline)" 2016. 
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Figure 110 
 
Cheap crude oil in the international market made it difficult for China to follow its agenda of 
producing more crude oil domestically for energy independence and selling less gasoline 
domestically to deiscourage consumption for environmental protection. Being a temporary 
solution to this problem of international market disrupting domestic system, this “price floor” 
was not a straight forward decision. After NDRC’s statement of pausing the adjustment on 
December 15th, the government apparently hosted several closed-door hearings and discussions11 
before reaching a decision as to whether a revision on the government referential price of 
gasoline is necessary. So, why did China do this? Why did China choose to manage this 
artificially higher price through the “price floor” policy? 
 
                                         
10 Data Source: World Bank.  
11 See "专家：如何正确认识成品油价格调整_政策法规解读_中国政府网 (Expert: On How to Correctly Understand the Price 
Floor Policy and Gasoline Price Adjustment)". 2016 
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Literature Review 
As early as the 1970s, scholarly research began investigating the relationship between oil 
and politics. Actions within the world oil market often weighs into many countries’ decision 
making process due to the integration of political and economic impact in the international oil 
market. As the oil market evolves and countries grow, it becomes evident that more oil-related 
policies are in place to regulate or restrain powerful influence and spill-over effect of the oil 
industry12. Application of “price floor” was discussed but never actually applied to the US gas 
industry, even though the conclusion of specific literature provides a positive result for a potential 
price floor13. China’s decision of implementing the “price floor” policy has not be discussed by 
any scholarly research yet. Therefore, research in this thesis should be able to provide more insight 
serving both as an individual case study of oil-related policy in China and as an analysis that could 
be generalized on China’s policy making process to future research.  
Due to the versatility of oil-based product, literatures also vary in their different focus on 
impacts by the oil market. Analysis had been done using VAR or SVAR model, CGE model, etc., 
as well as other more qualitative methodological approaches to examine the impact of oil price 
fluctuation and policies on a country’s economy and political position14. Correlations between oil 
price and wage, unemployment rate, consumption, are some of the most common focus in 
                                         
12 See Odell, 1971; Chen, Chen and Hhrdle, 2014.  
13 See Weijermars, 2011. 
14 See Duan, 2010; Wu 吴 et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015.  
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literatures of the past decades. However, most of such analysis are directed towards the US, Japan 
and the Middle East. Though these countries are the traditional giants in the oil industry as well as 
centers of international geopolitics, framework of the international oil market has changed 
gradually in the last decade. China took over the US’s position as the world’s largest oil importer 
in 2013, yet literatures do not pay much attention to China’s policies and its critical position in 
international economics as well as politics. This thesis should be able to account for the impact oil 
price policy has on China’s current position, and China’s consideration behind this gasoline “price 
floor” policy.  
In addition to literatures on impact of oil price, research done on policies resembling this more 
resent “price floor” China implemented done by other countries also contributes to the literature 
review. The US sugar policies is a critical topic surrounded by many scholarly discourse, in fields 
of economics and politics. Protection towards domestic produce (sugar in particular) in the US had 
both positive and negative externalities, but most were economic related factors. Literature on 
protectionism policies by the US discussed problems with such policy including glut in the market, 
and diminishing profit due to decreasing demand.15 For the “price floor” policy China is using 
now, this thesis will try to investigate the motives for China to engage in this policy that does not 
appear to be protectionism, but actually allows suppliers to charge an artificially higher gasoline 
price.  
                                         
15 See Hafi, Connell and Roberts, 1994. 
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Part 1 
Structure of China’s Oil and Gasoline Market 
The overarching CCP regime is controlling oil and gasoline markets through regulations 
implemented by government institutions like the NDRC. The NDRC makes decisions about all 
policies regarding commodity pricing. Since the Chinese government has almost absolute control 
over the domestic oil production and refinement markets, previous pricing mechanism revisions 
were all implemented without any backlash. The CCP was clearly satisfied with the results of its 
existing gasoline pricing mechanism (before the international crude oil plunged) which was 
established three years ago:  
… For the past 3 years, the mechanism has been stable and effective in promptly 
reflecting the international crude oil market’s fluctuations, ensuring gasoline 
market’s normal supply, promoting healthy competition within the market; in 
addition, the enhancing transparency of price adjustment represents one step 
closer to marketization…16 
Figure 2 shows the monthly rate of fluctuation comparison between crude oil and gasoline price 
in the international market. And the proximity of these two lines reflects a similar rate of change 
on crude oil price and gasoline price internationally. The existing gasoline pricing mechanism in 
China is evidently trying to close the gap between its gasoline price’s fluctuation and the 
international crude oil price’s fluctuation. NDRC official’s statement shows the Chinese 
government’s support of this pricing mechanism.  
                                         
16 See policy read, "国家发展改革委就进一步完善成品油价格机制有关问题答记者问 (NDRC Q&As on Revising the 
Gasoline Pricing Mechanism through Price Floor Policy)". 
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Figure 217 
 
However, China was forced to take actions when the international crude oil price made an 
unexpected turn for the worse, so that other higher priorities such as energy independence and 
reduction of pollution would not be hindered. The final response was this “price floor” applied to 
the existing gasoline pricing mechanism.  
Any price-related policy requires market participation, meaning companies of the targeted 
market must be involved. The oil production and refinement industries in China are drastically 
different from a free market. Domestic oil and gasoline markets are controlled by the oligopoly 
of these three state owned enterprises(SOE): PetroChina18, SinoPec and CNOOC. Table 1 
provides some details related to their current standing in the production and refinement markets.  
                                         
17 Data Source: World Bank 
18 Direct subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).  
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Table 119 
Company Title Scope of Business Amount of Crude Oil 
imported as Raw Material 
for Refinement 
PetroChina Focus predominantly on crude oil 
production, with a relatively small 
oil refinement sector.  
30% 
Sinopec Focus predominantly on oil 
refinement, and a relatively small 
crude oil production sector.  
80% 
China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) 
Focus solely on offshore crude oil 
production, with a significantly 
smaller oil refinement sector.  
N/A 
These SOEs’ top priority is to achieve the party’s assigned goals, whether it being 
economically or politically oriented. To achieve “long-term energy security, and eventually 
energy independence” that the Chinese Communist Party20 is hoping for, these SOEs have been 
striving to increase their crude oil production for the past decade. Despite “the low quality of 
domestic crude oil endowment and high production cost,”21 Figure 3 shows this general trend of 
                                         
19 Information gathered from annual reports of each company.  
20 Referred to as CCP in other parts of this thesis.  
21 See policy read, "国家发展改革委就进一步完善成品油价格机制有关问题答记者问 (NDRC Q&As on Revising the 
Gasoline Pricing Mechanism through Price Floor Policy)". 
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growth in crude oil production that supports the understanding of the Chinese government 
having control over these SOEs’ behaviors.  
Figure 322 
 
Together, these three oligopolies represent both the crude oil production sector and the gasoline 
production (oil refinement) sector impacted by this new “price floor” policy.  
 Last party that would be influenced by this new “price floor” policy is the consumers who 
are paying retail prices based on this government referential price mechanism for gasoline. 
Figure 4 provides a general summary of vehicles owned by domestic consumers, that can be 
translated into demand for gasoline consumption.  
                                         
22 Data Source: www.tradingeconomics.com, U.S. Energy Information Administration.  
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Figure 423 
 
The steady increasing trend in Figure 4 can be used as projection to demand for gasoline in 2016. 
As the international crude oil price decreases gradually over the years, it is reasonable to predict 
a higher demand for gasoline and more automobile usage in 2016. However, the circumstance 
changed after this new “price floor” was implemented by the NDRC. Consumers are directly 
impacted by this artificially high price of gasoline. 
Figure 5 shows the number of private vehicle ownership in China’s major cities in blue bars, 
and red bars represents number of private vehicle ownership in major automobile-concentrated 
cities worldwide for the purpose of comparison. After calculation with respect to numbers shown 
in Figure 5, roughly 80% of China’s vehicle population are owned by private individuals.  
                                         
23 Data Source: China Ministry of Public Security; Xinhua News Agency.  
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Figure 524 
 
 
Impact on Different Sectors 
 Like mentioned earlier, the gasoline pricing mechanism was regulating market price in a 
direction that the Chinese government expected until the international crude oil price plummeted 
to its lowest point since 2003 (as shown in Figure 6).  
                                         
24 See "Counting Cars: Rising Private Automobile Ownership In Chinese Cities Paves Road For Gasoline Demand | China 
Signpost™" 2013 
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Figure 625 
 
China’s NDRC released this statement of adding “price floor”, as a response to stop the 
falling trend of international crude oil price leading to a large downward adjustment on domestic 
gasoline price required by the pricing mechanism at that time. It could be a short-term solution to 
China’s  
The NDRC that released the policy did not have any other role but that of an observant after 
the “price floor” became effective. As long as the market remained relatively stable and isolated 
from the international crude oil price shock, which it did, the NDRC only needed to monitor the 
market trend and kept track of the international crude oil price so that it knew when to resume 
the adjustment function of gasoline pricing mechanism.  
Between January 13th and April 26th, the “price floor” was effective as the international 
crude oil price fluctuated below the $40/barrel baseline. After that period, the “price floor” was 
                                         
25 Data Source: World Bank.  
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neutralized while the policy remained in place as the international crude oil market gradually 
recovered and the crude oil price became higher than $40/barrel. When the NDRC stated the 
conclusion that China’s domestic crude oil and gasoline market would be better off with a “price 
floor” in place, it did not specify the impact such “price floor” has on different parties involved. 
For that 4-month period, the SOEs who are suppliers in the gasoline markets were able to 
keep an artificially higher price for their products. A higher price in the market can lead to higher 
profit, but also reduces demand for gasoline. At least a proportion of those two consequences 
will cancel out, so the positive impact of this “price floor” is likely less than expected. At the 
same time, the plunging international crude oil price led to a struggling domestic crude oil 
market for all three oligopolies that also produced crude oil. According to semiannual reports in 
accordance with IFRSs, PetroChina’s net profit for the first half of 2016 was 77 million US 
dollars, with a Year-on-Year26 decreases of 98%; Sinopec’s net profit was 2.9 billion US dollars, 
with a YoY decrease of 22%; CNOOC experienced a net loss of 1.1 billion US dollars. Because 
of the plunging international crude oil price, PetroChina and CNOOC, focusing more on crude 
oil production than refinement, experienced more problems trying to generate profit as they 
competed against cheaper crude oil produced at lower cost in other countries than in China. 
PetroChina reached its worst performance of the same period since it went public in 2007. And it 
was the first time CNOOC experiences a net loss since its listing in 2001. Sinopec, on the other 
hand, focuses on oil refinement and distribution, imported 80% of its crude oil used in 
                                         
26 Year-on-Year (YoY) rate refers to the compared % change with the same period from last year. 
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refinement from the international market. Because it was paying a lower price for imported crude 
oil input and charging higer price for gasoline output which was facilitated by the government’s 
“price floor” policy, Sinopec reflected more directly on the positive impact of this policy as it 
experienced less loss than the other two oligopolies.  
 Finally, the impact of this “price floor” is reflected on consumers. All retail consumers had 
to purchase gasoline at a higher price while being exposed to the news about plunging crude oil 
price. The decrease in demand was inevitable when price was higher than the expected 
equilibrium, and resulted in excess supply from the domestic market. However, Figure 4 from 
earlier section does indicate one fact: there are at least 172 million vehicles already in the 
demand pool by 2016. Even if growth of vehicle population between January and April of 2016 
is assumed to be zero, this artificial high price would have little impact as to the usage of 
gasoline for the majority of that pool due to inelasticity of demand. When the price floor freezed 
the adjustment of domestic gasoline price between January and April, the price was kept at 
$3.45-$3.67 per barrel. This was more than double of the international gasoline price, which was 
arounf $1.35/barrel during the same period.  
Part 2 
Why this “price floor” Policy? 
 Being required to follow the gasoline pricing mechanism, China’s domestic gasoline 
 20 
had to adjust at the same rate of fluctuation as that of the plunging international crude oil price . 
Stated by the NDRC official, this “price floor” is supposed to keep the gasoline price 
domestically at a higher level. On the face of it, this “price floor” is China’s response to 
problems raised by international crude oil price shock. As identified in previous section, the 
result of this “price floor” allowed suppliers to charge higher gasoline price and decreased 
demand. Ideally, the short-term results will support the government’s goals such as 
environmental protection and providing a buffer for domestic companies involved in both crude 
oil production and gasoline refinement.  
Environment 
 One clear incentive for this “price floor” is for environmental protection. In any model of 
regular demand and supply, higher price causes a decrease in demand and less consumption on 
complimentary goods. As a result of this “price floor” policy, the higher gasoline price led to a 
small decrease in consumption of gasoline and discourage usage of automobiles. Less car usage 
meant less tailpipe emissions, so the mitigating effect on air pollution would help in supporting 
China’s long-term environmental protection goal.  
Environmental problem in China has gained its exposure and the government’s attention 
over the past five years as the situation deteriorated. The key contributing factors is usage of 
non-renewable energy. China’s heavy pollution is the serious byproduct of generations of 
industrialization and urbanization. Beijing, being the capital of China, is selected to reflect on the 
 21 
general condition of China, as it is one of the cities marked average on China’s environmental 
pollution ranking. Figure 7 shows China’s rapid increase in CO2 emissions from energy 
consumption after the millennium.  
Figure 727 
  
And Figure 8 maps out the PM 2.528 levels country wide in 2012, and Beijing is marked as a 
dark red region, meaning its PM 2.5 level is at 70.00 or more. The average PM 2.5 level for 
China in 2012 is 48 mg/m3. What does that number mean? World Health Organization says that 
anything above 10 units is unhealthy. China’s average was 3 times more than that standard value, 
and Beijing’s PM 2.5 level was at least 6 times over the limit.  
                                         
27 Figure from "The East Is Grey", 2013.  
28 PM 2.5 measures tiny particles that reduce visibility and cause air to appear hazy. It is defined as an air pollutant that is a 
concern for people's health when levels in air are high. And this measurement is assumed to be a more accurate reflection on 
individual level pollution.  
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Figure 829 
 
The problem did not alleviate much since. According figures provided by the Beijing 
Environmental Protection Bureau, this country’s capital city had 179 of the 356 days in 2015 
marked as “polluted”, and 43 of those 179 were “heavily polluted”30. For the purpose of more 
coherent and accurate data presentation, PM 2.5 value is used as a proxy to represent 
environmental conditions. The trend for Beijing’s PM 2.5 value from 2008 to 2014 is shown in 
Figure 9, whereas 2015 and 2016 are jointly graphed out in Figure 10 and Figure 11 for 
comparison. Figure 9 show an obvious trend of increasing PM 2.5 levels, but the peak is still 
below 200 mg/m3.  
                                         
29 Figure from “Browner, But Greener". 2014.  
30 The definition of “heavily polluted” by the Chinese government is “children, elderlies, people with lung and heart conditions 
are advised to avoid outdoor activities and stay inside; healthy population could experience different symptoms if exposed 
outdoor for a period of time.” 
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Figure 931 
 
Figure 10 below shows the PM 2.5 value monitored daily by the US Embassy in Beijing 
before implementation of the “price floor” and after. Both sets of data are between the months of 
January to April, to control other influencing factors to the maximum extent possible. The blue 
line consistes of data points from 2015, with the yellow dotted line showing the general trend of 
PM 2.5 value in 2015. The green line consistes of data from 2016, with the red dotted line 
showing the general trend of PM 2.5 value in that period. As the yellow and the red dotted lines 
in this graph indicates, the air pollution is on a better trend with smaller PM 2.5 values in 2016 
since the implementation of the “price floor” in general. But the proximity of the yellow and red 
dotted lines points to a relatively small scope for the positive impact of this price floor. 
                                         
31 Data Source: US Embassy (Beijing) Official website. Note that the small gap at the end of 2008 is due to missing data around 
the time right after the Beijing Olympics, when the US embassy raised more attention with its daily PM 2.5 monitor and the data 
release was suspended.  
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Additionally, data points at the beginning of January 2016 showed a PM 2.5 value at above 500, 
when international oil price was plunging and the “price floor” was not yet in the picture. And 
the zigzag shape of the blue and green curves presents suggests a high volatility for the air 
pollution, which is proven with a standard deviation calculation. 2015 data series has a standard 
deviation of 95.1, and 2016 data series has a standard deviation of 92.8.  
Figure 1032 
 
To better examine the effectiveness of this “price floor” on gasoline in improving 
environment, the comparison between same period of year 2015 and 2016 is plotted out in Figure 
11. The orange sections again represent data from 2016, and the blue sections represent data 
from 2015. The dates when orange sections exceed blue ones shows a higher PM 2.5 value for 
                                         
32 Data Source: US Embassy (Beijing) Official website. 
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2016 than that of 2015, meaning the environmental condition is worse. Additional analysis on the 
raw data, presented in Figure 10, gives the exact number of days: 41. The number suggests two 
third of the entire 120-day period included in this 2016 data set have better air quality than that 
of 2015.Also, the median of 2016 data series is 39.5 and the mean is 76.9, which is significantly 
smaller than the median of 77.5 and mean of 104.1 in the 2015 data series. Together, they show a 
general improvement on environment during those four months. Yet, because of the 1:2 ratio of 
worse and better conditions and a high standard deviation of 92.8, it is evident that the volatility 
of environmental pollution is still high, which could be because this “price floor” policy only had 
a temporary effect on the gasoline price which ended in April 2016.  
Figure 1133 
 
The serious environmental pollution problem clearly motivates the Chinese government to 
                                         
33 Data Source: US Embassy (Beijing) Official website. 
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maintain gasoline price at a higher level to desensitize people from consuming gasoline and 
using vehicles. The assumption behind Chinese government’s motivation for this “price floor” is 
that with reasonably higher gasoline price introduced by the policy, demand for gasoline will 
decrease. It would then result in decrease of automobile usage, which leads to less tail gas 
emission, and improving the environment at least in the short-run. And according to figures 
presented above, it is showing a small but positive impact on the environment during the period 
when the “price floor” was effective.  
However, taxation would have had a similar effect on the consumer side, but China NDRC 
did not choose to employ that tool. Instead, this “price floor” was implemented. So why not 
taxation? The short answer would be: tax is not welcomed by the society. The long answer would 
have to relate to China’s current political atmosphere. After President Xi took office in 2012, he 
has built up this reputation for trying to gain more recognition from ordinary citizens. Even 
though different from Trump’s kind of populism, Xi is known for endorsing many populism 
actions and reviving certain aspects from Mao’s era. He has been conscious of the social media, 
and news coverage, and has been engaging in more affable activities like tasting dishes at an 
ordinary Chinese dumpling restaurant, allowing supporter groups to call him “Xi Da Da” on 
social media, etc. The government under his ruling is more reluctant to choose the obviously 
unpopular solution, namely additional tax, when a more “hidden” means of taxation – the “price 
floor” – is available. Even though beneath the ambiguity on the surface of it, this “price floor” 
ultimately performs the exact process and leads to similar consequences, just like a tax would. 
 27 
Another consideration the Chinese government might have kept in mind is the different channels 
those additional cash gained by a higher price would go through and the destination of those 
extra cash. A tax will input all cash gained into the government, whereas the “price floor” will 
allow the cash flow to move from consumers directly into the suppliers’ accounts. Indeed the 
suppliers are state-owned companies, but they are structured as independent entities that are not 
included in the government’s financial accounts. This allows the government to isolate itself 
more from the actual process taking place within the market.  
Desire to Subsidize/Protect Domestic Companies 
With the environmental problem in mind, the Chinese government could also be motivated 
to artificially push up gasoline price through this “price floor” due to its desire to subsidize 
companies in the energy market and potentially support a long-term energy security goal. Still 
categorized as a developing country, the “price floor” turned out to be more strategic and 
beneficial for China. Besides official explanations on China’s goals shown at the beginning of 
this thesis, the NDRC further explains the high production cost in China is unable to keep up 
with the plunging international crude oil price, which is bad for the domestic companies’ 
development. The NDRC indicated that would lead to obstacles in achieving China’s goal of 
gradually transforming its highly state-controlled oil and gasoline markets into free markets. The 
interconnected gasoline refinement and crude oil production sectors within those oligopolies 
would allow this “price floor” on gasoline to be a temporary shied for the domestic companies 
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when encountering high volatility in the international market like the case with plunging 
international crude oil price. However, China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. The 
significant position it occupies also generates “spill over” effect on the international oil and 
gasoline markets every time this “price floor” that China just imposed is effective.  
Official statement from NDRC confirms China’s concern regarding energy dependence on 
the international market:  
…To mitigate the impact international market has on the domestic market, 
guarantee long-term domestic energy security, it is crucial to manage a limitation 
on the domestic refined oil product pricing mechanism. From the aspect of national 
energy security, maintaining a stable, healthy, and sustainable domestic oil and gas 
industry fits strategic direction of national interests. Basic energy policy 
orientation requires a production quantity of over 1.4 billion barrels/year to 
decrease overreliance on imports… Current situation of oil and gas companies 
shows a higher production cost than international crude oil price, so they have 
already been reducing production under the plunging oil price. If the trend 
continues, once the oil price bounces back, those companies will face an even 
higher cost to return to their original level of production. This possibility will 
hinder the normal functionality of domestic companies in the oil industry, resulting 
in greater economic losses. Therefore, it is in the nation’s best interest, as well as 
the industry’s, to implement reasonable regulations…34 
Dominant interest of the Chinese government is clearly to achieve greater independence in the 
energy sector, and this “price floor” is signaling China’s attitude towards shifting its highly 
energy dependent position in the long-run.  
Even though this “price floor” has been painted as a shield for domestic companies involved 
in oil refinement that were hit hard by the plunging international oil price, the intention of 
                                         
34 See policy read, "国家发展改革委就进一步完善成品油价格机制有关问题答记者问 (NDRC Q&As on Revising the 
Gasoline Pricing Mechanism through Price Floor Policy)". 
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indirectly subsidizing SOEs beyond its gasoline sector is also stated in the NDRC official 
document:  
… All extra amount of money gained because of the adjustment freeze imposed 
under this price floor will be categorized as contingency fund, which should be 
used mainly in improving energy conservation and emission reduction, upgrading 
quality of crude oil production, and ensuring crude oil supply security…35 
Note that this “contingency fund” remained with the SOEs, and was not controlled directly by 
the government.  
Though, previous analysis on the semiannual reports from all three SOEs showed a problem 
that the Chinese government did not account for, which contributed to the decrease in general 
profitability for the domestic companies. The assumption NDRC holds for this “price floor” did 
not address the contradiction between generation of profits and decrease in demand in the 
gasoline market. The decrease in demand of gasoline led to declining sales revenue, thus 
generating less profit for the companies than the Chinese government would have expected. But 
the counteraction was relatively small in scale, while the insulation between plunging crude oil 
price in the international market and domestic gasoline price through adjustment freeze created a 
large gap for companies involved in refinement to gain more profit. Evidence of this combined 
positive influence is extracted from Sinopec’s semiannual report which indicated that its 
refinement/gasoline sector achieved a net gain of 4.3 billion US dollars, yielding a YoY increase 
of 113%. An important factor for this positive result is the fixed majority of consumers who are 
                                         
35 See policy read, "国家发展改革委就进一步完善成品油价格机制有关问题答记者问 (NDRC Q&As on Revising the 
Gasoline Pricing Mechanism through Price Floor Policy)". 
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purchasing gasoline for their vehicles as necessities. Though small alterations to this fixed 
majority of consumers might have contributed to the decrease in demand, generally inelastic 
demand for gasoline could not change much after the price was artificially set at a higher level 
by the “price floor”, assuming most private owners/consumers are purchasing gasoline for their 
automobiles with the intent to use them as means of transportation. Hence, the profit gain from 
higher gasoline price exceeded the loss of demand that was limited due to the nature of gasoline 
consumption in the retail market. 
 Being world’s largest crude oil importer, China is heavily dependent on the international oil 
market, hence the tremendous impact plunging oil price had on the domestic market causing 
China NDRC to issue the “price floor”. China continueed to stock up crude oil by importing 
from a lower international price, as shown by Figure 12: Amount of crude oil imported by China 
of the one-year period between June 2015 and June 2016. In Figure 12, the peak of crude oil 
import in December was before this “price floor” policy was ammounced, and then a steady 
increasing trend was observed during the four-month period when the policy froze domestic 
gasoline adjustment. To further the goal of achieving long-term energy independence, this 
strategy enabled Chinese companies to maintain a higher price of gasoline (refined product of 
crude oil) which could be viewed as a form of subsidization through the market for their loss in 
the crude oil production sector. According the Chinese officials, the “price floor” is a “necessary 
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precaution on the path to marketization of the domestic oil industry.”36 This expectation of 
China relies on similar impact of a strategy many countries had employed in the past. Such 
protectionism policy would strategically isolate the domestic industry until it achieved an 
equivalent level of development to compete in the international market.  
Figure 637 
 
Regarding the possibility that the government is using the “price floor” to indirectly 
subsidize domestic companies, China could have simply subsidized crude oil production to 
maintain a reasonable level of production domestically while the international price plummeted. 
NDRC decided to go with the “price floor” after consulting experts and holding several hearings, 
without explicitly respond to the reason behind choosing this form of indirect subsidy channeled 
                                         
36 See "专家：如何正确认识成品油价格调整_政策法规解读_中国政府网  (Expert: On How to Correctly Understand the 
Price Floor Policy and Gasoline Price Adjustment)", 2016. 
37 Data Source: China General Administration of Customs; WSJ.com. Note: the unit for y-axis is million metric tons.  
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through the gasoline market, instead of a direct subsidy towards the crude oil sector. However, 
the implicit political and economic explanation behind this policy lies in the nature of subsidies. 
A direct subsidy requires huge government spending, and leaves a record of China engaging in 
act of protectionism. On the contrary, this new “price floor” transfers the financial burden of 
subsidizing those SOEs to consumers in the market, and disguise the intent of protection and 
long-term energy independence. Because China has been under strict scrutiny from the 
international community, this “price floor” helps China intervene in the market without leaving 
apparent evidence of subsidizing domestic companies and manipulating the oil industry.  
Besides, China’s authoritarian regime provides the government with convenience of 
implementing a “price floor” at minimum economic cost domestically. Unlike a “price floor” in 
the U.S., for example, where the government must buy up the excess supply resulted from it, all 
that the Chinese government needs to do is issue the “guidance paper” and the SOEs involved 
will follow. In the case of this “price floor” policy, the “wheels” of domestic oil and gasoline 
market started spinning after this initial push. Cash flowed directly from consumers to suppliers, 
allowing SOEs to accrue their “contingency fund” and avoiding additional government spending 
for the regime. On the downside, though, the result of this “price floor” during its effective 
period between January and April of 2016 was an excess export dumped into the international 
gasoline market (shown in Figure 13), which raised problem for other foreign oil refineries. The 
orange arrow indicating a smaller slop shows the growing imports when international crude oil 
began to drop, whereas the red arrow shows a steeper slop indicating greater rate of increase in 
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China’s gasoline inventories. As the figure noted, this inventory increase resulted in a worldwide 
glut.  
Figure 738 
 
However, likely due to the relatively short time span, it did not cause a disturbance significant 
enough to draw attention to this “price floor”. As shown above in Figure 13, the trend stabilized 
and experienced a slight decrease as the international crude oil price recovered and the “price 
floor” was no longer blocking the gasoline price adjustment. Chinese government’s decision to 
implement this policy on top of its gasoline pricing mechanism has achieved, to an extent, the 
backward subsidizing effect that the government could be seeking. The ambiguity on the surface 
of this new policy provides China with the flexibility of denying it being interventionism, which 
                                         
38 Data Sources: Energy Aspects; WSJ.com.  
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would not be possible if it employed a direct subsidy policy.  
Conclusion 
It is obvious through presentation of impacts done by the “price floor” policy that the policy 
only mitigates China’s concerns in the short-term, as the “price floor” introduced the adjustment 
freeze in January and then resumed adjustment in April.  
The environmental proxy, PM 2.5 value for major cities in China, shows positively changed 
slightly after the beginning of 2016 compares to the year before. But the volatility suggests that 
this policy is not a permenant solution to China’s concern for the environmental problem. 
However, it is utilized by the government under President Xi’s control to mask the policy’s 
nature of being a “hidden” tax. As for the desire to subsidize domestic oligopolies, this research 
shows that these domestic oligopolies are state-owned enterprises involving in both crude oil 
production and oil refining businesses. Data indicates China is decreasing its crude oil import 
while its domestic oil production is increasing, proving that China has been pushing for a higher 
level of oil, eventually energy, independence, after its decision of maintaining a price floor. This 
“price floor” could be a development strategy leading to oil independence while avoiding the 
negative image of direct subsidies towards domestic oligopolies. The choice between direct 
subsidy and this “price floor” is viewed as China’s good public relations decision since it now 
does not have present this image of directly involved in the market economy. In addition, the 
special political circumstance of China being a more totalitarian regime leads to this “price floor” 
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policy. The government did not have to buy up the excess supply to achieve the price floor, and 
was able to hold up this popular reputation for the party leader, President Xi.  
To better understand conclusions reached from this research, limitations need to be 
recognized and potential solutions can be proposed for the purpose of future research. Biggest 
limitation is the relatively short effective period for this “price floor” policy. This thesis attempts 
to research the rationale behind this choice of “price floor” policy China made, and reaches the 
conclusion that the Chinese government is more conscious of the populism influence on the party 
and attention from the international community in their decision making process. Due to the 
short response time (less than a year) given to the market and the society, no comparison could 
be made to examine the conclusion of this thesis. Future researches could have access to 
additional time period where this “price floor” policy is effective and use that for comparison.  
This research is significant because it could be applied to and assit in understanding other 
policies made by China in the Chinese political system. With the coal industry in China asking 
for this exact same policy now, scholars could analyse and anticipate China’s decision based on 
the research of this thesis.  
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